Cryptanalysis Course Part III – DLPs in intervals

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with some slides by Daniel J. Bernstein



Additive walks

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More efficient: use additive walk: Start with $W_0 = a_0 P$ and put $f(W_i) = W_i + c_j P + d_j Q$ where $j = h(W_i)$. Pollard's initial proposal: Use $x(W_i) \mod 3$ as hand update:

 $W_{i+1} = \begin{cases} W_i + P \text{ for } x(W_i) \mod 3 = 0\\ 2W_i & \text{for } x(W_i) \mod 3 = 1\\ W_i + Q \text{ for } x(W_i) \mod 3 = 2 \end{cases}$

Easy to update a_i and b_i .

 $egin{aligned} &(a_{i+1},b_{i+1})&=\ &\left\{egin{aligned} &(a_i+1,b_i) \ &(a_i+1,b_i) \ &(x(W_i) \ &mod \ 3=0\ &(2a_i,2b_i) \ &for \ &x(W_i) \ &mod \ 3=1\ &(a_i,b_i+1) \ &for \ &x(W_i) \ &mod \ 3=2 \end{aligned}
ight.$

Additive walk requires only one addition per iteration.

h maps from $\langle P \rangle$ to $\{0, 1, \ldots, r - 1\}$, and $R_j = c_j P + d_j Q$ are precomputed for each $j \in \{0, 1, \ldots, r - 1\}$.

Easy coefficient update: $W_i = a_i P + b_i Q$, where a_i and b_i are defined recursively as follows:

$$egin{aligned} a_{i+1} &= a_i + c_{h(\mathcal{W}_i)} \ ext{and} \ b_{i+1} &= b_i + d_{h(\mathcal{W}_i)}. \end{aligned}$$

Additive walks have disadvantages:

The walks are noticeably nonrandom; this means they need more iterations than the generic rho method to find a collision.

This effect disappears as r grows, but but then the precomputed table R_0, \ldots, R_{r-1} does not fit into fast memory. This depends on the platform, e.g. trouble for GPUs.

More trouble with adding walks later.

Randomness of adding walks

Let h(W) = i with probability p_i .

Fix a point T, and let W and W' be two independent uniform random points.

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Randomness of adding walks

Let h(W) = i with probability p_i .

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Let $W \neq W'$ both map to T. This event occurs if simultaneously for $i \neq j$: $T = W + R_i = W' + R_j$; h(W) = i; h(W') = j.

These conditions have probability $1/\ell^2$, p_i , and p_j respectively.

Summing over all (i, j)gives the overall probability $\left(\sum_{i\neq j}p_ip_j\right)/\ell^2$ $\left(\sum_{i,j} p_i p_j - \sum_i p_i^2\right)/\ell^2$ $(1 - \sum_{i} p_{i}^{2}) / \ell^{2}.$

This means that the probability of an immediate collision from Wand W' is $(1 - \sum_i p_i^2) / \ell$, where we added over the ℓ choices of T. In the simple case that all the p_i are 1/r, the difference from the optimal $\sqrt{\pi \ell/2}$ iterations is a factor of $1/\sqrt{1-1/r} \approx 1+1/(2r).$

Various heuristics leading to standard $\sqrt{1-1/r}$ formula in different ways: 1981 Brent–Pollard; 2001 Teske; 2009 ECC2K-130 paper, eprint 2009/541. Various heuristics leading to standard $\sqrt{1-1/r}$ formula in different ways: 1981 Brent–Pollard; 2001 Teske; 2009 ECC2K-130 paper, eprint 2009/541.

2010 Bernstein–Lange: Standard formula is wrong! There is a further slowdown from higher-order anti-collisions: e.g. $W + R_i + R_k \neq W' + R_j + R_l$ if $R_i + R_k = R_j + R_l$. $\approx 1\%$ slowdown for ECC2K-130.

Eliminating storage

Usual description: each walk keeps track of a_i and b_i with $W_i = a_i P + b_i Q$.

This requires each client to implement arithmetic modulo ℓ or at least keep track of how often each R_j is used.

For distinguished points these values are transmitted to server (bandwidth) which stores them as e.g. (W_i, a_i, b_i) (space).

2009 ECC2K-130 paper: Remember where you started. If $W_i = W_j$ is the collision of distinguished points, can recompute these walks with a_i, b_i, a_j , and b_j ; walk is deterministic! Server stores 245 distinguished points; only needs to know coefficients for 2 of them.

Our setup: Each walk remembers seed; server stores distinguished point and seed. Saves time, bandwidth, space.

Negation and rho

W = (x, y) and -W = (x, -y)have same *x*-coordinate. Search for *x*-coordinate collision.

Search space for collisions is only $\lceil \ell/2 \rceil$; this gives factor $\sqrt{2}$ speedup ... if $f(W_i) = f(-W_i)$.

To ensure $f(W_i) = f(-W_i)$: Define $j = h(|W_i|)$ and $f(W_i) = |W_i| + c_j P + d_j Q$. Define $|W_i|$ as, e.g., lexicographic minimum of W_i , $-W_i$. This negation speedup is textbook material.

Problem: this walk can run into fruitless cycles! Example: If $|W_{i+1}| = -W_{i+1}$ and $h(|W_{i+1}|) = j = h(|W_i|)$ then $W_{i+2} = f(W_{i+1}) =$ $-W_{i+1} + c_j P + d_j Q =$ $-(|W_i|+c_jP+d_jQ)+c_jP+d_jQ =$ $-|W_i|$ so $|W_{i+2}| = |W_i|$ so $W_{i+3} = W_{i+1}$ so $W_{i+4} = W_{i+2}$ etc.

If h maps to r different values then expect this example to occur with probability 1/(2r)at each step. Known issue, not quite textbook.

Eliminating fruitless cycles

Issue of fruitless cycles is known and several fixes are proposed. See appendix of full version ePrint 2011/003 for even more details and historical comments.

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So what to do? Choose a big r, e.g. r = 2048. 1/(2r) = 1/4096 small; cycles infrequent. Define |(x, y)| to mean (x, y) for $y \in \{0, 2, 4, \dots, p-1\}$ or

(x, -y) for $y \in \{1, 3, 5, \dots, p-2\}$.

Precompute points $R_0, R_1, \ldots, R_{r-1}$ as known random multiples of P.

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Precompute points $R_0, R_1, \ldots, R_{r-1}$ as known random multiples of P. Can do full scalar multiplication in inversion-free coordinates! Start each walk at a point $W_0 = |b_0 Q|,$ where b_0 is chosen randomly. Compute W_1, W_2, \ldots as $W_{i+1} = |W_i + R_{h(W_i)}|.$

Occasionally, every w iterations, check for fruitless cycles of length 2. For those cases change the definition of W_i as follows: Compute W_{i-1} and check whether $W_{i-1} = W_{i-3}$. If $W_{i-1} \neq W_{i-3}$, put $W_i = W_{i-1}$. If $W_{i-1} = W_{i-3}$, put $W_i = |2\min\{W_{i-1}, W_{i-2}\}|,$ where min means lexicographic minimum. Doubling the point makes it escape the cycle.

Cycles of length 4, 6, or 12 occur far less frequently. Cycles of length 4, or 6 are detected when checking for cycles of length 12; so skip individual ones.

Same way of escape: define $W_i =$ $|2\min\{W_{i-1}, W_{i-2}, W_{i-3}, W_{i-4}, W_{i-5}, W_{i-6}, W_{i-7}, W_{i-8}, W_{i-9}, W_{i-10}, W_{i-11}, W_{i-12}\}|$ if trapped and $W_i = W_{i-1}$ otherwise.

Do not store all these points!

When checking for cycle, store only potential entry point W_{i-13} (one coordinate, for comparison) and the smallest point encountered since (to escape).

For large DLP look for larger cycles; in general, look for fruitless cycles of even lengths up to $\approx (\log \ell)/(\log r)$.

How to choose w?

Fruitless cycles of length 2 appear with probability $\approx 1/(2r)$. These cycles persist until detected. After *w* iterations. probability of cycle $\approx w/(2r)$, wastes $\approx w/2$ iterations (on average) if it does appear. Do not choose w as small as possible! If a cycle has *not* appeared then the check wastes an iteration.

The overall loss is approximately $1 + w^2/(4r)$ iterations out of w. To minimize the quotient 1/w + w/(4r) we take $w \approx 2\sqrt{r}$.

Cycles of length 2*c* appear with probability $\approx 1/r^c$, optimal checking frequency is $\approx 1/r^{c/2}$.

Loss rapidly disappears

as c increases.

Can use lcm of cycle lengths to check.

Concrete example: 112-bit DLP

Use r = 2048. Check for 2-cycles every 48 iterations.

- Check for larger cycles much less frequently.
- Unify the checks for 4-cycles and 6-cycles into a check for 12-cycles every 49152 iterations.
- Choice of r has big impact!
- r = 512 calls for checking
- for 2-cycles every 24 iterations.
- In general, negation overhead
- pprox doubles when table size
- is reduced by factor of 4.

Bernstein, Lange, Schwabe (PKC 2011):

Our software solves random ECDL on the same curve (with no precomputation) in 35.6 PS3 years on average. For comparison: Bos–Kaihara–Kleinjung–Lenstra– Montgomery software uses 65 PS3 years on average. Bernstein, Lange, Schwabe (PKC 2011):

Our software solves random ECDL on the same curve (with no precomputation) in 35.6 PS3 years on average. For comparison: Bos–Kaihara–Kleinjung–Lenstra– Montgomery software uses 65 PS3 years on average. First big speedup:

We use the negation map. Second speedup: Fast arithmetic.

Why are we confident this works?

We only have 1 PlayStation-3, not 200 used in their record. Don't want to wait for 36 years to show that we actually compute the right thing.

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Can produced scaled versions: Use *same* prime field (so that we can compare the field arithmetic) and same curve shape $y^2 = x^3 - 3x + b$ but vary *b* to get curves with small subgroups. This produces other curves, and many of those have smaller order subgroups.

Specify DLP in subgroup of size 2^{50} , or 2^{55} , or 2^{60} and show that the actual running time matches the expectation.

And that DLP is correct.

We used same property for a point to be distinguished as in big attack; probability is 2^{-20} . Need to watch out that walks do not run into rho-type cycles (artefact of small group order). We aborted overlong walks.

New record

Announced 29 Nov 2016, most work by Ruben Niederhagen (@cryptocephaly on twitter).

Elliptic curve over **F**₂₁₂₇, DLP in subgroup of order 2^{117.35}. Used parallel Pollard rho, DP criterion: 30 top bits equal 0.

Expected

 $\sqrt{\pi 2^{117.35}/4}/2^{30} \sim 379\,821\,956$

DPs, but ended up needing 968 531 433.

Computations ran on 64 to 576 FPGAs in parallel.

DLs in intervals



Want to use knowledge that DL is in a small interval [a, b], much smaller than ℓ .

We can use this in baby-step giant-step algorithm.

How to use this in a memory-less algorithm?

Standard interval method: Pollard's kangaroo method.

Pollard's kangaroos do small jumps around the interval.

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Real kangaroos sleep



(at least outside Australia).

Kangaroo method

in Australia Main actor:



The tame kangaroo



starts at a known multiple of P, e.g. bP.



Jumps are determined by current position.



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The tame kangaroo stops

after a fixed number of jumps (about $\sqrt{b-a}$ many).

The tame kangaroo installs a trap and waits.

The wild kangaroo

starts at point Q. Follows the same instructions for jumps.

But we don't know where the starting point Q is. Know Q = nP with $n \in [a, b]$.

Hope that the paths of the tame and wild kangaroo intersect.

Similar to the rho method the kangaroos will hop on the same path from that point onwards.

Eventually the wild kangaroo falls into the trap.

(Or disappears in the distance if paths have not intersected. Start a fresh one

from Q + P, Q + 2P,)

Same story in math

Kangaroo = sequence $X_i \in \langle P \rangle$. Starting point $X_0 = s_0 P$. Distance $d_0 = 0$. Step set: $S = \{s_1 P, ..., s_I P\},\$ with s_i on average $s = \beta \sqrt{b-a}$. Hash function $H: \langle P \rangle \to \{1, 2, \ldots, L\}.$ Update function $i = 0, 1, 2, \ldots,$ $d_{i+1} = d_i + s_{H(X_i)},$ $X_{i+1} = X_i + s_{H(X_i)}P$, i = 0, 1, 2, ...

Picture credit: Christine van Vredendaal.

Parallel kangaroo method

Use an entire herd

of tame kangaroos, all starting around ((b - a)/2)P ...

... and define certain spots as distinguished points

Also start a herd of wild kangaroos around *Q*. Hope that one wild and one tame kangaroo meet at one distinguished point.

<u>Pairings</u>

Let $(G_1, +), (G_2, +)$ and (G_7, \cdot) be groups of prime order ℓ and let $e: G_1 \times G_2 \to G_T$ be a map satisfying e(P + Q, R') = e(P, R')e(Q, R'),e(P, R' + S') = e(P, R')e(P, S').Request further that e is non-degenerate in the first argument, i.e., if for some Pe(P, R') = 1 for all $R' \in G_2$, then P is the identity in G_1

Such an *e* is called a *bilinear map* or *pairing*.

Consequences of pairings

Assume that $G_1 = G_2$, in particular $e(P, P) \neq 1$.

Then for all triples $(P_1, P_2, P_3) \in \langle P \rangle^3$ one can decide in time polynomial in $\log \ell$ whether $\log_P(P_3) = \log_P(P_1) \log_P(P_2)$ by comparing $e(P_1, P_2)$ and $e(P, P_3)$. This means that the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is easy.

The DL system G_1 is at most as secure as the system G_T .

Even if $G_1 \neq G_2$ one can transfer the DLP in G_1 to a DLP in G_T , provided one can find an element $P' \in G_2$ such that the map $P \rightarrow e(P, P')$ is injective.

Pairings are interesting attack tool if DLP in G_T is easier to solve; e.g. if G_T has index calculus attacks. We want to define pairings $G_1 \times G_2 \rightarrow G_T$

preserving the group structure.

The pairings we will use map to the multiplicative group of a finite extension field \mathbf{F}_{q^k} . More precisely, $G_T \subset \mathbf{F}_{q^k}$, order ℓ .

To embed the points of order ℓ into \mathbf{F}_{q^k} there need to be ℓ -th roots of unity are in $\mathbf{F}_{q^k}^*$.

The embedding degree k satisfies k is minimal with $\ell \mid q^k - 1$.

E is supersingular if for $|E(\mathbf{F}_q)| = q + 1 - t$, $q = p^r$, it holds that $t \equiv 0 \mod p$.

Otherwise it is ordinary.

Example: $y^2 + y = x^3 + a_4 x + a_6$ over F_{2^r} is supersingular: Each (x, y) point also gives $(x, y+1) \neq (x, y).$ All points come in pairs, except for ∞ , so $|E(\mathbf{F}_{2^{r}})| = 1 + \text{even},$ so $t \equiv 0 \mod 2$.

Embedding degrees

- Let *E* be supersingular and $q = p \ge 5$, i.e $p > 2\sqrt{p}$.
- Hasse's Theorem states
- $|t| \leq 2\sqrt{p}.$
- *E* supersingular implies
- $t \equiv 0 \mod p$, so t = 0 and $|E(\mathbf{F}_p)| = p + 1$.

Obviously $(p+1) \mid p^2 - 1 = (p+1)(p-1)$ so $k \leq 2$ for supersingular curves over prime fields.

Distortion maps

For supersingular curves there exist maps $\phi : E(\mathbf{F}_q) \rightarrow E(\mathbf{F}_{q^k})$ i.e. maps $G_1 \rightarrow G_2$, giving $\tilde{e}(P, P) \neq 1$ for $\tilde{e}(P, P) =$ $e(P, \phi(P))$. Such a map is called a *distortion map*.

These maps are important since the only pairings we know how to compute are variants of *Weil pairing* and *Tate pairing* which have e(P, P) = 1.

Examples: $u^2 = x^3 + a_4 x$ for $p \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$. Distortion map $(x, y) \mapsto (-x, \sqrt{-1y}).$ $y^2 = x^3 + a_6$, for $p \equiv 2 \pmod{3}$. Distortion map $(x, y) \mapsto (jx, y)$ with $j^3 = 1, j \neq 1$. In both cases, $\#E(\mathbf{F}_p) = p + 1$, so k=2.

Example from Tuesday:

 $p = 1000003 \equiv 3 \mod 4$ and $y^2 = x^3 - x$ over **F**_p.

Has 1000004 = p + 1 points.

P = (101384, 614510) is a point of order 500002.

nP = (670366, 740819).Construct \mathbf{F}_{p^2} as $\mathbf{F}_p(i).$ $\phi(P) = (898619, 614510i).$

Invoke magma and compute $e(P, \phi(P)) = 387265 + 276048i;$ $e(Q, \phi(P)) = 609466 + 807033i.$ Solve with index calculus to get n = 78654.(Btw. this is the clock).

Summary of pairings

Menezes, Okamoto, and Vanstone for *E* supersingular:

- For p = 2 have $k \leq 4$.
- For p=3 we $k\leq 6$
- Over \mathbf{F}_p , $p \geq 5$ have $k \leq 2$.
- These bounds are attained.

Not only supersingular curves: MNT curves are non-supersingular curves with small *k*.

Other examples constructed for pairing-based cryptography – but small *k* unlikely to occur for random curve.

Summary of other attacks

Definition of embedding degree does not cover all attacks. For \mathbf{F}_{p^n} watch out that pairing can map to $\mathbf{F}_{p^{km}}$ with m < n. Watch out for this when selecting curves over \mathbf{F}_{p^n} .

Anomalous curves: If E/\mathbf{F}_p has $\#E(\mathbf{F}_p) = p$ then transfer $E(\mathbf{F}_p)$ to $(\mathbf{F}_p, +)$. *Very* easy DLP. Not a problem for Koblitz curves, attack applies to order-p subgroup. Weil descent: Maps DLP in *E* over $\mathbf{F}_{p^{mn}}$ to DLP on variety *J* over \mathbf{F}_{p^n} . *J* has larger dimension; elements represented as polynomials of low degree. \Rightarrow index calculus.

This is efficient if dimension of J is not too big.

Particularly nice to compute with *J* if it is the Jacobian of a hyperelliptic curve *C*.

For genus g get complexity $\tilde{O}(p^{2-\frac{2}{g+1}})$ with the factor base described before, since polynomials have degree $\leq g$.