Cryptology, cryptography, cryptanalysis. Definitions, meanings, requirements, and current challenges

Tanja Lange

Technische Universiteit Eindhoven



26 September 2018

ENISA summer school

Cryptographic applications in daily life

- Mobile phones connecting to cell towers.
- Credit cards, EC-cards, access codes for banks.
- Electronic passports; soon ID cards.
- Internet commerce, online tax declarations, webmail.
- Facebook, Gmail, WhatsApp, iMessage on iPhone.
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Snowden in Reddit AmA

> *Arguing that you don't care about the right to privacy because you have nothing to hide is no different than saying you don't care about free speech because you have nothing to say.*

Cryptography

- Motivation #1: Communication channels are spying on our data.
- Motivation #2: Communication channels are modifying our data.

Sender
“Alice”

Untrustworthy network
“Eve”

Receiver
“Bob”

- Literal meaning of cryptography: “secret writing”.
- Achieves various security goals by secretly transforming messages.

iacrmemHEREATiacr.org

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR CRYPTOLOGIC RESEARCH

2013

1702 Members
(1580 in 2012)

1245 Regular+

457 Students


https://www.iacr.org/
https://www.iacr.org/docs/minutes/c2013mem-slides.pdf
IACR Mer
16 /
www.iacr.org
Your connection to this site is private.
Permissions
Connection
The identity of this website has been verified by RapidSSL SHA256 CA - G3.
No Certificate Transparency information was supplied by the server.
Certificate information
Your connection to www.iacr.org is encrypted using a modern cipher suite.
The connection uses TLS 1.2.
The connection is encrypted and authenticated using AES_128_GCM and uses ECDHE_RSA as the key exchange mechanism.
What do these mean?
iacrm

Secret-key encryption

- Prerequisite: Alice and Bob share a secret key  .
- Prerequisite: Eve doesn't know  .
- Alice and Bob exchange any number of messages.
- Security goal #1: **Confidentiality** despite Eve's espionage.

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

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- Alice publishes any number of messages.
- Security goal: Integrity.

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

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$m \longrightarrow m, s \longrightarrow m, s \longrightarrow m$

$k \longrightarrow K$

Secret key $k =$  , public key $K =$  .

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

- Alice uses Bob's public key $K =$  to encrypt.
- Bob uses his secret key $k =$  to decrypt.


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Public-key authenticated encryption ("DH" data flow)



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Cryptographic tools

Many factors influence the security and privacy of data:

- Secure storage, physical security; access control.
- Protection against alteration of data
  $\Rightarrow$ public-key signatures, message-authentication codes.
- Protection of sensitive content against reading
  $\Rightarrow$ encryption.

Many more security goals studied in cryptography

- Protecting against denial of service.
- Stopping traffic analysis.
- Securely tallying votes.
- Searching in and computing on encrypted data.
- ...

Cryptanalysis

- Cryptanalysis is the study of security of cryptosystems.
- Breaking a system can mean that the hardness assumption was not hard or that it just was not as hard as previously assumed.
- Cryptanalysis is ultimately constructive – ensure that secure systems get used.
- Weakened crypto ultimately backfires – attacks in 2018 because of crypto wars in the 90s.
- Good arsenal of general approaches to cryptanalysis. There are some automated tools.
- This area is constantly under development; researchers revisit all systems continuously.

Security assumptions

- Hardness assumptions at the basis of all public-key and essentially all symmetric-key systems result from (failed) attempts at breaking systems. Security proofs are built only on top of those assumptions.
- A solid symmetric systems is required to be as strong as exhaustive key search.
- For public-key systems the best attacks are faster than exhaustive key search. Parameters are chosen to ensure that the best attack is infeasible.

Key size recommendations

	Parameter	Legacy	Future System Use	
			Near Term	Long Term
Symmetric Key Size	k	80	128	256
Hash Function Output Size	m	160	256	512
MAC Output Size*	m	80	128	256
RSA Problem	$\ell(n) \geq$	1024	3072	15360
Finite Field DLP	$\ell(p^n) \geq$	1024	3072	15360
	$\ell(p), \ell(q) \geq$	160	256	512
ECDLP	$\ell(q) \geq$	160	256	512
Pairing	$\ell(p^{k \cdot n}) \geq$	1024	6144	15360
	$\ell(p), \ell(q) \geq$	160	256	512

- Source: ECRYPT-CSA "Algorithms, Key Size and Protocols Report" (2018).
- These recommendations take into account attacks known today.
- Use extrapolations to larger problem sizes.
- Attacker power typically limited to 2^{128} operations (less for legacy).
- More to come on long-term security ...

Attackers exploit physical reality

- 1996 Kocher: Typical crypto is broken by **side channels**.
- Side channels can be any information obtainable on the computation:
  - Time taken.
  - Power consumption (total or over time).
  - Electro-magnetic radiation.
  - Noise, heat, light emission.
- If this information is related to secret information, an attacker might be able to learn the secret (many measurements, statistics, machine learning).
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- Response: Hundreds of papers on side-channel defenses and on attacks and on more defenses.
- It is important to study what information is leaked for any given hardware; build a good model.
- Modify the implementation so that no/less information is leaked.
- CHES (Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems) conference is main publication venue.

Summary: current state of the art

- Currently used crypto (check the lock icon in your browser) starts with RSA, Diffie-Hellman (DH) in finite fields, or elliptic curve ECDH.
- Older standards are RSA or elliptic curves from NIST (or Brainpool), e.g. NIST P256 or ECDSA.
- Internet currently moving over to Curve25519 (Bernstein) and Ed25519 (Bernstein, Duif, Lange, Schwabe, and Yang).
- For symmetric crypto TLS (the protocol behind https) uses AES or ChaCha20 and some MAC, e.g. AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly305. High-end devices have support for AES-GCM, smaller ones do better with ChaCha20-Poly305.
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- Security is getting better. Some obstacles: bugs; untrustworthy hardware; let alone anti-security measures such as backdoors.

Algorithms for Quantum Computation: Discrete Logarithms and Factoring

Peter W. Shor
AT&T Bell Labs
Room 2D-149
600 Mountain Ave.
Murray Hill, NJ 07974, USA

Abstract

A computer is generally considered to be a universal computational device; i.e., it is believed able to simulate any physical computational device with a cost in computation time of at most a polynomial factor. It is not clear whether this is still true when quantum mechanics is taken into consideration. Several researchers, starting with David Deutsch, have developed models for quantum mechanical computers and have investigated their computational properties. This paper gives Las Vegas algorithms for finding discrete logarithms and factoring integers on a quantum computer that take a number of steps which is polynomial in the input size, e.g., the number of digits of the integer to be factored. These two problems are generally considered hard on a classical computer and have been used as the basis of several proposed cryptosystems. (We thus give the first examples of quantum cryptanalysis.)

[1, 2]. Although he did not ask whether quantum mechanics conferred extra power to computation, he did show that a Turing machine could be simulated by the reversible unitary evolution of a quantum process, which is a necessary prerequisite for quantum computation. Deutsch [9, 10] was the first to give an explicit model of quantum computation. He defined both quantum Turing machines and quantum circuits and investigated some of their properties.

The next part of this paper discusses how quantum computation relates to classical complexity classes. We will thus first give a brief intuitive discussion of complexity classes for those readers who do not have this background. There are generally two resources which limit the ability of computers to solve large problems: time and space (i.e., memory). The field of analysis of algorithms considers the asymptotic demands that algorithms make for these resources as a function of the problem size. Theoretical computer scientists generally classify algorithms as efficient when the number of steps of the algorithms grows as a polynomial in the size of the input. The class of prob-


D-Wave
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- Can't run other quantum algorithms we care about.
- Hasn't managed to find any computation justifying its price.
- Hasn't managed to find any computation justifying 1% of its price.

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  - The discrete-logarithm problem in finite fields. DSA is dead.
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- Also, Grover's algorithm speeds up brute-force searches.
- Example: Only 2^{64} quantum operations to break AES-128; 2^{128} quantum operations to break AES-256.

Physical cryptography: a return to the dark ages

- Imagine a lockable-briefcase salesman proposing a "locked-briefcase Internet" using "provably secure locked-briefcase cryptography":
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  - We should not dignify this proposal with a response.

Security advantages of algorithmic cryptography

- Keep secrets heavily shielded inside authorized computers.
- Reduce trust in third parties:
  - Reduce reliance on closed-source software and hardware.
  - Increase comprehensiveness of audits.
  - Increase comprehensiveness of formal verification.
  - Design systems to be secure even if **algorithm and public keys are public**.
    Critical example: **signed** software updates.
- Understand security as thoroughly as possible:
  - Publish comprehensive specifications.
  - Build large research community with clear security goals.
  - Publicly document attack efforts.
  - Require systems to convincingly survive many years of analysis.

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- PQCrypto 2008, PQCrypto 2010, PQCrypto 2011, PQCrypto 2013.
- 2014 EU publishes H2020 call including post-quantum crypto as topic.
- ETSI working group on "Quantum-safe" crypto.
- PQCrypto 2014.
- April 2015 NIST hosts first workshop on post-quantum cryptography
- August 2015 NSA wakes up

NSA announcements

August 11, 2015

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Post-quantum becoming mainstream

- PQCrypto 2016: 22–26 Feb in Fukuoka, Japan, $>$ 200 people

- NIST called for post-quantum proposals (deadline Nov 2017).
- 82 submissions; big effort to analyze, implement, prove, ...


PQCrypto 2018
The Ninth International Conference on Post-Quantum Cryptography
Fort Lauderdale, Florida, April 9-11, 2018

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  - Study side-channel attacks, fault attacks, etc.
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  - Focus on implementations meeting performance requirements.
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- Example: ECC introduced **1985**; big advantages over RSA. Robust ECC started to take over the Internet in **2015**.
- Can't wait for quantum computers before finding a solution!


ECC
IS
80s

Even higher urgency for long-term confidentiality

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- Protect your upgrades *now* with post-quantum signatures.

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  - Please wait for the research results, will be much better!
- But what about users who rely on long-term secrecy of today's communication?
- Recommend now, standardize later.
- Recommend very conservative systems now; users who care will accept performance issues and gladly update to faster/smaller options later.
- But: standardization takes lots of time, so start standardization processes now.

Urgency of post-quantum recommendations

- All currently used public-key systems on the Internet are broken by quantum computers.
- Today's encrypted communication can be (and is being!) stored by attackers and can be decrypted later with quantum computer – think of medical records, legal proceedings, and state secrets.
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

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- All currently used public-key systems on the Internet are broken by quantum computers.
- Today's encrypted communication can be (and is being!) stored by attackers and can be decrypted later with quantum computer – think of medical records, legal proceedings, and state secrets.
- Post-quantum secure cryptosystems exist (to the best of our knowledge) but are under-researched – we can recommend secure systems now, but they are big and slow hence the logo of the PQCRYPTO project.



- PQCRYPTO is an EU project in H2020, running 2015 – 2018.
- PQCRYPTO is designing a portfolio of high-security post-quantum public-key systems, and will improve the speed of these systems, adapting to the different performance challenges of mobile devices, the cloud, and the Internet.

Initial recommendations of long-term secure post-quantum systems

Daniel Augot, Lejla Batina, Daniel J. Bernstein, Joppe Bos, Johannes Buchmann, Wouter Castryck, Orr Dunkelman, Tim Güneysu, Shay Gueron, Andreas Hülsing, Tanja Lange, Mohamed Saied Emam Mohamed, Christian Rechberger, Peter Schwabe, Nicolas Sendrier, Frederik Vercauteren, Bo-Yin Yang

Initial recommendations

- **Symmetric encryption** Thoroughly analyzed, 256-bit keys:
  - AES-256
  - Salsa20 with a 256-bit key

  Evaluating: Serpent-256, ...
- **Symmetric authentication** Information-theoretic MACs:
  - GCM using a 96-bit nonce and a 128-bit authenticator
  - Poly1305
- **Public-key encryption** McEliece with binary Goppa codes:
  - length $n = 6960$, dimension $k = 5413$, $t = 119$ errors

  Evaluating: QC-MDPC, Stehlé-Steinfeld NTRU, ...
- **Public-key signatures** Hash-based (minimal assumptions):
  - XMSS with any of the parameters specified in CFRG draft
  - SPHINCS-256

  Evaluating: HFEv-, ...

Systems expected to survive

- Code-based crypto, see talks by Daniel Loebenberger
- Hash-based signatures, see talks by Stefan-Lukas Gazdag
- Isogeny-based crypto: new kid on the block, promising short keys and key exchange without communication (static-static) as possibility; needs more reserach on security; not covered here.
- Lattice-based crypto, see talk by Vadim Luybashevsky
- Multivariate crypto, not covered here.
- Symmetric crypto.

Maybe some more, maybe some less.

Post-quantum secret-key authenticated encryption

- Very easy solutions if secret key k is long uniform random string:
  - "One-time pad" for encryption.
  - "Wegman–Carter MAC" for authentication.
- AES-256: Standardized method to expand 256-bit k into string indistinguishable from long k.
- AES introduced in 1998 by Daemen and Rijmen. Security analyzed in papers by dozens of cryptanalysts.
- No credible threat from quantum algorithms. Grover costs 2^{128}.
- Some recent results assume attacker has quantum access to compuation, then some systems are weaker

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- Some recent results assume attacker has quantum access to compuation, then some systems are weaker . . . but I'd know if my laptop had turned into a quantum computer.

Further resources

- https://pqcrypto.org: Our survey site.
  - Many pointers: e.g., PQCrypto conference series.
  - Bibliography for 4 major PQC systemss.
- PQCrypto 2016 with slides and videos from lectures (incl. winter school)
- PQCrypto 2017
- https://pqcrypto.eu.org: PQCRYPTO EU project.
  - Expert recommendations.
  - Free software libraries.
  - More benchmarking to compare cryptosystems.
- https://twitter.com/pqc_eu: PQCRYPTO Twitter feed.
- https://2017.pqcrypto.org/school: PQCRYPTO summer school with 21 lectures on video + slides + exercises.
- https://2017.pqcrypto.org/exec: Executive school (12 lectures), less math, more overview. So far slides, soon videos.
- https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography/round-1-submissions NIST PQC competition.