Lattice-based cryptography I Definitions and LLL

Tanja Lange (with some slides from Daniel J. Bersntein and Nadia Heninger)

Eindhoven University of Technology


SAC – Post-quantum cryptography

A lattice is a discrete subgroup of \mathbf{R}^n .


We can think of a lattice as being generated by integer multiples of some basis vectors.




A lattice can have many different bases.




We can represent a lattice as a matrix of basis vector coefficients:




A change of basis multiplies B by an integer unimodular matrix U:



Here is a lattice in three dimensions



Here is a lattice in three dimensions



Easier to think abstractly of $L = \{\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i b_i | a_i \in \mathbb{Z}\}$ for a given basis $\{b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n\}$. We typically work with lattices of rank n in \mathbb{R}^n .

Tanja Lange

The Shortest Vector Problem (SVP)


How to measure shortness? We typically use the Euclidean distance:

$$||(c_1, c_2, ..., c_n)|| = \sqrt{c_1^2 + c_2^2 + \cdots + c_n^2}$$

The Shortest Vector Problem (SVP)

Given an arbitrary basis for L, find a shortest nonzero vector v_1 in L.

- Slow algorithm to compute exact solution. (Exponential time!)
- Fast algorithm to compute approximate solution. (Polynomial time!)



Computational problems on lattices: CVP


Closest Vector Problem (CVP)

Given an arbitrary basis for L, and a point x find the vector in L closest to x.

• CVP is NP-hard.

We can find pretty close vectors efficiently.

This gets much easier with a basis of short and close-to-orthogonal vectors: we can just round.



LLL – Lenstra, Lenstra, and Lovász, 1982

- On input $\{b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_n\}$ as matrix B, output shorter and more orthogonal basis $\{\tilde{v}_1, \tilde{v}_2, \ldots, \tilde{v}_n\}$ with $\tilde{v}_j = \sum a_i b_i, a_i \in \mathbb{Z}$.
- LLL uses many elements from Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization:
 - for j = 1 to n

• for
$$i = 1$$
 to $j - 1$


•
$$\mu_{ij} = \frac{\langle \mathbf{v}_i^*, \mathbf{b}_j \rangle}{\langle \mathbf{b}_i^*, \mathbf{b}_i^* \rangle}$$

•
$$b_j^* = b_j - \sum_{i=1}^{j-1} \mu_{ij} b_i^*$$

- Note that the μ_{ij} are not integers, so the b^{*}_i are not in the lattice.
- A lattice basis is LLL-reduced for parameter 0.25 $< \delta < 1$ if
 - $|\mu_{ij}| \le 0.5$ for all $1 \le j < i \le n$,

•
$$(\delta - \mu_{i-1i}^2) ||b_{i-1}^*||^2 \le ||b_i^*||^2.$$

• This guarantees $||\tilde{v}_1|| \leq (2/\sqrt{4\delta-1})^{(n-1)/2} \det(B)^{1/n}.$



Tanja Lange

LLL algorithm (from Cohen, GTM 138, transposed)

Input: Basis $\{b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n\}$ of lattice *L*, $0.25 < \delta < 1$ Output: LLL reduced basis for *L* with parameter δ

- 1 $k \leftarrow 2, k_{\max} \leftarrow 1, b_1^* \leftarrow b_1, B_1 = \langle b_1, b_1 \rangle$ 2 if $k \le k_{\max}$ go to step 3 else $k_{\max} \leftarrow k, b_k^* \leftarrow b_k$, for j = 1 to k - 1• put $\mu_{jk} \leftarrow \langle b_j^*, b_k \rangle / B_j$ and $b_k^* \leftarrow b_k^* - \mu_{jk} b_j^*$ $B_k = \langle b_k, b_k \rangle$
- **3** Execute RED(k, k 1). If $(\delta \mu_{i-1i}^2)B_{k-1} > B_k$ execute SWAP(k) and $k \leftarrow \max\{2, k 1\}$; else for = k 2 down to 1 execute RED(k, j) and $k \leftarrow k + 1$.
- 4 If $k \leq n$ go to step 2; else output basis $\{b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_n\}$.
- RED(k, j): If $|\mu_{jk}| \leq 0.5$ return; else $q \leftarrow \lfloor \mu_{jk} \rceil$, $b_k \leftarrow b_k qb_j$, $\mu_{jk} \leftarrow \mu_{jk} q$, for i = 1 to j 1 put $\mu_{ik} \leftarrow \mu_{ik} q\mu_{ij}$ and return.
- SWAP(k): Swap b_k and b_{k-1}. If k > 2 for j = 1 to k − 2 swap μ_{jk} and μ_{jk-1} and update all variables to match (see p.88 in Cohen)

For a nice visualization see pages 61-66 of

http://thijs.com/docs/lec1.pdf. (Animations only work in acroread.)

Sage has an implementation of LLL, you can call it on matrices.

Tanja Lange

Lattice-based cryptography I