Hash-based signatures IV Stateless signatures

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SAC – Post-quantum cryptography

#### Trees of Merkle trees



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 $T_i$  are one-time signatures.  $\uparrow$  indicates input to hash function.





#### Huge trees (1987 Goldreich), keys on demand (Levin)

Signer chooses random  $r \in \{2^{255}, 2^{255} + 1, \dots, 2^{256} - 1\}$ , uses one-time public key  $T_r$  to sign message; uses one-time public key  $T_i$  to sign  $(T_{2i}, T_{2i+1})$  for  $i < 2^{255}$ . Generates *i*th secret key as  $H_k(i)$  where *k* is master secret.



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 $T_i$  for small *i* gets used repeatedly (each time an *m* falls in that sub-tree) but  $H_k(i)$  being deterministic means it signs the same value, so no break.

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Hash-based signatures IV

## Use Goldreich to create stateless hash-based signatures

0.6 MB for hash-based Goldreich signature using short-public-key Winternitz-16 one-time signatures.

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Example:

HTTPS typically sends multiple signatures per page.

1.8 MB average web page in Alexa Top 1000000.

# Ingredients of SPHINCS (and SPHINCS-256)

Drastically reduce tree height (to 60).

Replace one-time leaves with few-time leaves.

Optimize few-time signature size *plus* key size. New few-time HORST, improving upon HORS (see exercise sheet 4).

Use hyper-trees (12 layers), as in GMSS. Use masks, as in XMSS and  $XMSS^{MT}$ , for standard-model security proofs.

Optimize short-input (256-bit) hashing speed. Use sponge hash (with ChaCha12 permutation). Use fast stream cipher (again ChaCha12). Vectorize hash software and cipher software.

See paper for details: sphincs.cr.yp.to
Updated version is NIST submission SPHINCS+
https://sphincs.org/.

