Stream Ciphers and Block Ciphers

2WC12 Cryptography I - Fall 2014

Ruben Niederhagen

TU/e

Technische Universiteit **Eindhoven** University of Technology

September 18th, 2013

Recall from last lecture:

- Public-key crypto:
 - Pair of keys: public key for encryption, private key for decryption.



2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Recall from last lecture:

- Public-key crypto:
 - Pair of keys: public key for encryption, private key for decryption.
- Symmetric-key crypto:
 - Same shared secret key for encryption and decryption.



2WC12 Cryptography I - Fall 2014

Recall from last lecture:

- Public-key crypto:
 - Pair of keys: public key for encryption, private key for decryption.
- Symmetric-key crypto:
 - Same shared secret key for encryption and decryption.

Advantages, disadvantages..?



2/22

2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Stream Cipher vs. Block Cipher:

 Idea of a stream cipher: partition the text into small (e.g. 1bit) blocks; encoding of each block depends on the previous blocks.
 → A different "key" is generated for each block.



3/22

2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Stream Cipher vs. Block Cipher:

- Idea of a stream cipher: partition the text into small (e.g. 1bit) blocks; encoding of each block depends on the previous blocks.
 → A different "key" is generated for each block.
- Idea of a block cipher: partition the text into "large" (e.g. 128bit) blocks; encode each block independently.
 - \rightarrow The same "key" is used for each block.



2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Stream Ciphers:

- symmetric-key cipher
- state-driven: operates on arbitrary message length
- commonly used stream ciphers: A5/1 and A5/2 (GSM), RC4 (SSL, WEP), eSTREAM Project



2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Stream Ciphers:

- symmetric-key cipher
- state-driven: operates on arbitrary message length
- commonly used stream ciphers: A5/1 and A5/2 (GSM), RQ4 (SSL, WEP), eSTREAM Project



2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Stream Ciphers:

- symmetric-key cipher
- state-driven: operates on arbitrary message length
- commonly used stream ciphers: A5/1 and A5/2 (GSM), R²4 (SSL, WEP), eSTREAM Project

Operate on an *internal state* which is updated after each block.



2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Stream Ciphers and Block Ciphers

4/22

Stream Ciphers:

- symmetric-key cipher
- state-driven: operates on arbitrary message length
- commonly used stream ciphers: A5/1 and A5/2 (GSM), RQ4 (SSL, WEP), eSTREAM Project

Operate on an *internal state* which is updated after each block. Compute a *key stream* using the current state and the secret key.



4/22

2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Stream Ciphers:

- symmetric-key cipher
- state-driven: operates on arbitrary message length
- commonly used stream ciphers: A5/1 and A5/2 (GSM), RQ4 (SSL, WEP), eSTREAM Project

Operate on an *internal state* which is updated after each block. Compute a *key stream* using the current state and the secret key. Encrypt the *message stream* with the *key stream* to *cipher stream*.



Synchronous Stream Ciphers:

Given key K and initial state σ_{-1} :

state:
$$\sigma_i = f(\sigma_{i-1}, K)$$
 with next-state function f



2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Synchronous Stream Ciphers:

Given key K and initial state σ_{-1} :

state:	σ_i	=	$f(\sigma_{i-1}, K)$	with next-state function f
key stream:	Zi	=	$g(\sigma_i, K)$	with key-stream function g



2WC12 Cryptography I - Fall 2014

Synchronous Stream Ciphers:

Given key K and initial state σ_{-1} :

state:	σ_i	=	$f(\sigma_{i-1}, K)$	with next-state function f
key stream:	Zi	=	$g(\sigma_i, K)$	with key-stream function g
cipher stream:	Ci	=	$h(z_i, m_i)$	with output function <i>h</i>



2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Synchronous Stream Ciphers:

Given key K and initial state σ_{-1} :

state:	σ_i	=	$f(\sigma_{i-1}, K)$	with next-state function f
key stream:	Zi	=	$g(\sigma_i, K)$	with key-stream function g
				with output function <i>h</i>
decryption:	mi	=	$h^{-1}(z_i,c_i)$	with inverse of <i>h</i>



2WC12 Cryptography I - Fall 2014

Synchronous Stream Ciphers:

Given key K and initial state σ_{-1} :

state:	σ_i	=	$f(\sigma_{i-1}, K)$	with next-state function f
key stream:	Zi	=	$g(\sigma_i, K)$	with key-stream function g
cipher stream:	Ci	=	$z_i \oplus m_i$	
decryption:	mi	=	$z_i \oplus c_i$	



2WC12 Cryptography I - Fall 2014

Synchronous Stream Ciphers:

Given key K and initial state σ_{-1} :

state:	σ_i	=	$f(\sigma_{i-1}, K)$	with next-state function f
key stream:	Zi	=	$g(\sigma_i, K)$	with key-stream function g
cipher stream:	Ci	=	$z_i \oplus m_i$	
decryption:	mi	=	$z_i \oplus c_i$	

Self-Synchronizing Stream Ciphers:

Given key K and initial state $c_{-1} \dots c_{-t}$: state: $\sigma_i = (c_{i-1}, c_{i-2}, \dots c_{i-t})$

> TU/e Technische Universiteit Eindhoven University of Technology

2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Synchronous Stream Ciphers:

Given key K and initial state σ_{-1} :

state:	σ_i	=	$f(\sigma_{i-1}, K)$	with next-state function f
key stream:	Zi	=	$g(\sigma_i, K)$	with key-stream function g
cipher stream:	Ci	=	$z_i \oplus m_i$	
decryption:	mi	=	$z_i \oplus c_i$	

Self-Synchronizing Stream Ciphers:

Given key K and initial state $c_{-1} \dots c_{-t}$: state: $\sigma_i = (c_{i-1}, c_{i-2}, \dots c_{i-t})$ key stream: $z_i = g(\sigma_i, K)$ with key-stream function g



2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Synchronous Stream Ciphers:

Given key K and initial state σ_{-1} :

state:	σ_i	=	$f(\sigma_{i-1}, K)$	with next-state function f
key stream:	Zi	=	$g(\sigma_i, K)$	with key-stream function g
cipher stream:	Ci	=	$z_i \oplus m_i$	
decryption:	mi	=	$z_i \oplus c_i$	

Self-Synchronizing Stream Ciphers:

Given key K and	initia	l sta	te $c_{-1} \dots c_{-t}$:
state:	σ_i	=	$(c_{i-1}, c_{i-2}, \ldots c_{i-t})$
key stream:	Zi	=	$g(\sigma_i, K)$ with key-stream function g
cipher stream:	Ci	=	$h(z_i, m_i)$ with output function h



2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Synchronous Stream Ciphers:

Given key K and initial state σ_{-1} :

state:	σ_i	=	$f(\sigma_{i-1}, K)$	with next-state function f
key stream:	Zi	=	$g(\sigma_i, K)$	with key-stream function g
cipher stream:	Ci	=	$z_i \oplus m_i$	
decryption:	mi	=	$z_i \oplus c_i$	

Self-Synchronizing Stream Ciphers:

Given key K and	initia	l sta	te $c_{-1} c_{-t}$:
state:	σ_i	=	$(c_{i-1}, c_{i-2}, \ldots c_{i-t})$
key stream:	Zi	=	$g(\sigma_i, K)$ with key-stream function g
			$h(z_i, m_i)$ with output function h
decryption:	mi	=	$h^{-1}(z_i,c_i)$ with inverse of h



2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Synchronous Stream Ciphers:

Given key K and initial state σ_{-1} :

state:	σ_i	=	$f(\sigma_{i-1}, K)$	with next-state function f
key stream:	Zi	=	$g(\sigma_i, K)$	with key-stream function g
cipher stream:	Ci	=	$z_i \oplus m_i$	
decryption:	mi	=	$z_i \oplus c_i$	

Self-Synchronizing Stream Ciphers:

Given key K and initial state $c_{-1} \dots c_{-t}$:				
state:	σ_i	=	$(c_{i-1}, c_{i-2}, \ldots c_{i-t})$	
key stream:	Zi	=	$g(\sigma_i, K)$ with key-stream function g	
cipher stream:	Ci	=	$z_i \oplus m_i$	
decryption:	mi	=	$z_i \oplus c_i$	



2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Block Ciphers:

- symmetric-key cipher
- memoryless: operates on a fixed-length block size
- commonly used block ciphers: DES, Triple-DES, AES



2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Block Ciphers:

- symmetric-key cipher
- memoryless: operates on a fixed-length block size
- commonly used block ciphers: DES, Triple DES, AES



2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Stream Ciphers and Block Ciphers

6/22

Block Ciphers:

- symmetric-key cipher
- memoryless: operates on a fixed-length block size
- commonly used block ciphers: DES, Triple DES, AES

An *n*-bit block cipher is a function $E : \{0, 1\}^n \times \mathfrak{K} \to \{0, 1\}^n$. For each fixed key $K \in \mathfrak{K}$ the map

$$E_{\mathcal{K}}: \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^n, M \mapsto E_{\mathcal{K}}(M)$$

is invertible (bijective) with inverse $E_{K}^{-1}: \{0,1\}^{n} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{n}$.

2WC12 Cryptography I - Fall 2014



7/22


Modes of Operation:

- electronic codebook (ECB) mode,
- cipher-block chaining (CBC) mode,
- cipher feedback (CFB) mode,
- output feedback (OFB) mode,
- counter (CTR) mode.



Electronic Codebook (ECB) Mode:

► Encryption: obtain ciphertext C₁,..., C_t as C_i = E_K(M_i), i = 1...t






2WC12 Cryptography I - Fall 2014

Electronic Codebook (ECB) Mode:

► Decryption: obtain plaintext M₁,..., M_t as M_i = E⁻¹_K(C_i), i = 1...t




e Technische Universiteit Eindhoven University of Technology

2WC12 Cryptography I - Fall 2014

Electronic Codebook (ECB) Mode:

▶ Decryption: obtain plaintext M₁,..., M_t as




2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Cipher-Block Chaining (CBC) Mode:

Use a (non-secret) initialization vector (IV) of length n bits.

• Encryption: obtain ciphertext C_1, \ldots, C_t as $C_i = E_K(M_i \oplus C_{i-1}), i = 1 \ldots t, C_0 = IV$




2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Cipher-Block Chaining (CBC) Mode:

Use a (non-secret) initialization vector (IV) of length n bits.

• Decryption: obtain plaintext M_1, \ldots, M_t as $M_i = E_K^{-1}(C_i) \oplus C_{i-1}, i = 1 \ldots t, C_0 = IV$




2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Cipher Feedback (CFB) Mode:

Use a (non-secret) initialization vector (IV) of length n bits.

• Encryption: obtain ciphertext C_1, \ldots, C_t as $C_i = E_K(C_{i-1}) \oplus M_i, i = 1 \ldots t, C_0 = IV$




2WC12 Cryptography I - Fall 2014

Cipher Feedback (CFB) Mode:

Use a (non-secret) initialization vector (IV) of length n bits.

▶ Decryption: obtain plaintext M₁,..., M_t as M_i = E_K(C_{i-1}) ⊕ C_i, i = 1...t, C₀ = IV



2WC12 Cryptography I - Fall 2014


Output Feedback (OFB) Mode:

Use a (non-secret) initialization vector (IV) of length n bits.

• Encryption:

obtain ciphertext C_1, \ldots, C_t as

$$C_i = O_i \oplus M_i, \ i = 1 \dots t, \ O_i = E_{\mathcal{K}}(O_{i-1}), \ O_0 = IV$$



2WC12 Cryptography I - Fall 2014


Output Feedback (OFB) Mode:

Use a (non-secret) initialization vector (IV) of length n bits.

Decryption:

obtain plaintext M_1, \ldots, M_t as

$$M_i = O_i \oplus C_i, i = 1 \dots t, O_i = E_{\mathcal{K}}(O_{i-1}), O_0 = IV$$



2WC12 Cryptography I - Fall 2014


Counter (CTR) Mode:

Use a (non-secret) initialization vector (IV) of length n bits.

• Encryption:

obtain ciphertext C_1, \ldots, C_t as

$$C_i = E_\mathcal{K}(N_i) \oplus M_i, \ i = 1 \dots t, \ N_i = N_{i-1} + 1 \mod 2^n, \ N_0 = IV$$



2WC12 Cryptography I - Fall 2014

Stream Ciphers and Block Ciphers

12/22


Counter (CTR) Mode:

Use a (non-secret) initialization vector (IV) of length n bits.

Decryption:

obtain plaintext M_1, \ldots, M_t as

 $M_i = E_K(N_i) \oplus C_i, \ i = 1 \dots t, \ N_i = N_{i-1} + 1 \mod 2^n, \ N_0 = IV$



2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Properties of the Modes of Operation

- ECB is considered insecure if applied to more than one block: Identical input blocks are mapped to identical output blocks.
- ► In CBC and CFB mode, the last ciphertext block C_t depends on all message blocks M₁,..., M_t, in ECB, OFB, and CTR mode each block of ciphertext C_i only on message block M_i.
- CBC, CFB, and OFB encryption can not be performed in parallel on several blocks, ECB and CTR encryption can. CBC and CFB decryption also can be performed in parallel.
- Only ECB and CTR allow random access to the ciphertext.
- CBC and ECB require padding of the input to a multiple of the block size, CFB, OFB, and CTR don't.
- ► For OFB, CFB, and CTR mode each two messages encrypted with the same key must use a different *IV*.
- Most widely used modes are CBC and CTR.



2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

History:

 May 1973: NBS (NIST) publishes a first request for a standard encryption algorithm.



14/22

2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

History:

- May 1973: NBS (NIST) publishes a first request for a standard encryption algorithm.
- August 1974: NBS publishes a second request algorithms.



14/22

2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

History:

- May 1973: NBS (NIST) publishes a first request for a standard encryption algorithm.
- August 1974: NBS publishes a second request algorithms.
 IBM submits a candidate based on Horst Feistel's Lucifer cipher.



14/22

History:

- May 1973: NBS (NIST) publishes a first request for a standard encryption algorithm.
- August 1974: NBS publishes a second request algorithms.
 IBM submits a candidate based on Horst Feistel's Lucifer cipher.
- March 1975: DES proposal is published in the Federal Register. Public comments are requested.



14/22

2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

History:

- May 1973: NBS (NIST) publishes a first request for a standard encryption algorithm.
- August 1974: NBS publishes a second request algorithms.
 IBM submits a candidate based on Horst Feistel's Lucifer cipher.
- March 1975: DES proposal is published in the Federal Register. Public comments are requested.

Criticism from various researchers (e.g., Hellman and Diffie) about modifications in respect to the submission:

- shorter keylength (56bit instead of 64bit),
- modified "S-boxes".



14/22

2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

History:

- May 1973: NBS (NIST) publishes a first request for a standard encryption algorithm.
- August 1974: NBS publishes a second request algorithms.
 IBM submits a candidate based on Horst Feistel's Lucifer cipher.
- March 1975: DES proposal is published in the Federal Register.
 Public comments are requested.

Criticism from various researchers (e.g., Hellman and Diffie) about modifications in respect to the submission:

- shorter keylength (56bit instead of 64bit),
- modified "S-boxes".
- ► July 1991: Biham and Shamir (re-)discover differential cryptanalysis that requires 2⁴⁷ chosen plaintexts.



History:

- May 1973: NBS (NIST) publishes a first request for a standard encryption algorithm.
- August 1974: NBS publishes a second request algorithms.
 IBM submits a candidate based on Horst Feistel's Lucifer cipher.
- March 1975: DES proposal is published in the Federal Register. Public comments are requested.

Criticism from various researchers (e.g., Hellman and Diffie) about modifications in respect to the submission:

- shorter keylength (56bit instead of 64bit),
- modified "S-boxes".
- ► July 1991: Biham and Shamir (re-)discover differential cryptanalysis that requires 2⁴⁷ chosen plaintexts.

New S-boxes are stronger than the original S-boxes.



History:

- May 1973: NBS (NIST) publishes a first request for a standard encryption algorithm.
- Aug IBM
 Mai Pub Crit mod
 "NSA worked closely with IBM to strengthen the algorithm against all except brute force attacks and to strengthen substitution tables, called Sboxes. Conversely, NSA tried to convince IBM to reduce the length of the key from 64 to 48 bits. Ultimately they compromised on a 56-bit key."

her. ster.

about

- moannea poxes
- July 1991: Biham and Shamir (re-)discover differential cryptanalysis that requires 2⁴⁷ chosen plaintexts. New S-boxes are stronger than the original S-boxes.



History:

• in 1994: First experimental cryptanalysis using linear cryptanalysis.



15/22

2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

History:

- in 1994: First experimental cryptanalysis using linear cryptanalysis.
- ▶ June 1997: The DESCHALL Project breaks a DES key in 96 days.



15/22

2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

- in 1994: First experimental cryptanalysis using linear cryptanalysis.
- ▶ June 1997: The DESCHALL Project breaks a DES key in 96 days.
- July 1998: The EFF's DES cracker breaks a DES key in 56 hours.



15/22

2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

- in 1994: First experimental cryptanalysis using linear cryptanalysis.
- ▶ June 1997: The DESCHALL Project breaks a DES key in 96 days.
- July 1998: The EFF's DES cracker breaks a DES key in 56 hours.
- Oct. 1999: DES is reaffirmed for the fourth time as FIPS 46-3, which specifies the use of Triple DES (DES only for legacy systems).

- in 1994: First experimental cryptanalysis using linear cryptanalysis.
- ▶ June 1997: The DESCHALL Project breaks a DES key in 96 days.
- July 1998: The EFF's DES cracker breaks a DES key in 56 hours.
- Oct. 1999: DES is reaffirmed for the fourth time as FIPS 46-3, which specifies the use of Triple DES (DES only for legacy systems).
- May 2002: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) becomes effective.



15/22

- in 1994: First experimental cryptanalysis using linear cryptanalysis.
- ▶ June 1997: The DESCHALL Project breaks a DES key in 96 days.
- July 1998: The EFF's DES cracker breaks a DES key in 56 hours.
- Oct. 1999: DES is reaffirmed for the fourth time as FIPS 46-3, which specifies the use of Triple DES (DES only for legacy systems).
- May 2002: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) becomes effective.
- May 2005: NIST withdraws FIPS 46-3.



- in 1994: First experimental cryptanalysis using linear cryptanalysis.
- ► June 1997: The DESCHALL Project breaks a DES key in 96 days.
- July 1998: The EFF's DES cracker breaks a DES key in 56 hours.
- Oct. 1999: DES is reaffirmed for the fourth time as FIPS 46-3, which specifies the use of Triple DES (DES only for legacy systems).
- May 2002: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) becomes effective.
- May 2005: NIST withdraws FIPS 46-3.
- April 2006: The FPGA based COPACOBANA of the Universities of Bochum and Kiel breaks DES in 9 days at \$10,000 hardware cost.



- in 1994: First experimental cryptanalysis using linear cryptanalysis.
- ▶ June 1997: The DESCHALL Project breaks a DES key in 96 days.
- July 1998: The EFF's DES cracker breaks a DES key in 56 hours.
- Oct. 1999: DES is reaffirmed for the fourth time as FIPS 46-3, which specifies the use of Triple DES (DES only for legacy systems).
- May 2002: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) becomes effective.
- May 2005: NIST withdraws FIPS 46-3.
- April 2006: The FPGA based COPACOBANA of the Universities of Bochum and Kiel breaks DES in 9 days at \$10,000 hardware cost.
- Nov. 2008: The successor of COPACOBANA, the RIVYERA machine reduces the average time to less than one single day.



15/22

Use three 56-bit keys k_0 , k_1 , and k_2 .



16/22

2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Use three 56-bit keys k_0 , k_1 , and k_2 .

• Encryption: $C = E_{k_2}(D_{k_1}(E_{k_0}(M)))$



16/22

2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Use three 56-bit keys k_0 , k_1 , and k_2 .

- Encryption: $C = E_{k_2}(D_{k_1}(E_{k_0}(M)))$
- Decryption: $M = D_{k_0}(E_{k_1}(D_{k_2}(C)))$



2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Stream Ciphers and Block Ciphers

Use three 56-bit keys k_0 , k_1 , and k_2 .

- Encryption: $C = E_{k_2}(D_{k_1}(E_{k_0}(M)))$
- Decryption: $M = D_{k_0}(E_{k_1}(D_{k_2}(C)))$

Keying Options:

All three keys are independent and different,



16/22

2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Use three 56-bit keys k_0 , k_1 , and k_2 .

- Encryption: $C = E_{k_2}(D_{k_1}(E_{k_0}(M)))$
- Decryption: $M = D_{k_0}(E_{k_1}(D_{k_2}(C)))$

Keying Options:

- All three keys are independent and different,
- $k_0 = k_2$, and k_1 is different,



16/22

2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Use three 56-bit keys k_0 , k_1 , and k_2 .

- Encryption: $C = E_{k_2}(D_{k_1}(E_{k_0}(M)))$
- Decryption: $M = D_{k_0}(E_{k_1}(D_{k_2}(C)))$

Keying Options:

- All three keys are independent and different,
- $k_0 = k_2$, and k_1 is different,
- $k_0 = k_1 = k_2$ (fallback to DES for backward compatibility).



16/22

2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

History:

September 1997: NIST issued a public call for a new block cipher: block length of 128 bits; key lengths of 128, 192, and 256 bits.



17/22

2WC12 Cryptography I - Fall 2014

History:

- September 1997: NIST issued a public call for a new block cipher: block length of 128 bits; key lengths of 128, 192, and 256 bits.
- August 1998 and March 1999: AES1 and AES2 conferences organized by NIST.



2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

- September 1997: NIST issued a public call for a new block cipher: block length of 128 bits; key lengths of 128, 192, and 256 bits.
- August 1998 and March 1999: AES1 and AES2 conferences organized by NIST.
- August 1999: NIST announces 5 finalists:
 - MARS (IBM),
 - RCG (Rivest, Robshaw, Sidney, Yin),
 - Rijndael (Daemen, Rijmen),
 - Serpent (Anderson, Biham, Knudsen),
 - Twofish (Schneier).



17/22

2WC12 Cryptography I - Fall 2014

- September 1997: NIST issued a public call for a new block cipher: block length of 128 bits; key lengths of 128, 192, and 256 bits.
- August 1998 and March 1999: AES1 and AES2 conferences organized by NIST.
- August 1999: NIST announces 5 finalists:
 - MARS (IBM),
 - RCG (Rivest, Robshaw, Sidney, Yin),
 - Rijndael (Daemen, Rijmen),
 - Serpent (Anderson, Biham, Knudsen),
 - Twofish (Schneier).
- April 2000: AES3 conference.



17/22

2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

- September 1997: NIST issued a public call for a new block cipher: block length of 128 bits; key lengths of 128, 192, and 256 bits.
- August 1998 and March 1999: AES1 and AES2 conferences organized by NIST.
- August 1999: NIST announces 5 finalists:
 - MARS (IBM),
 - RCG (Rivest, Robshaw, Sidney, Yin),
 - Rijndael (Daemen, Rijmen),
 - Serpent (Anderson, Biham, Knudsen),
 - Twofish (Schneier).
- April 2000: AES3 conference.
- ▶ October 2nd, 2000: NIST announces Rijndael as winner.



2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Parameters:

- fixed block size of 128bit,
- ▶ variable key size (in bits): AES-128, AES-192, AES-256.

Animation:

http://www.cs.bc.edu/~straubin/cs381-05/blockciphers/ rijndael_ingles2004.swf



2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Rijndael S-box:

For y in
$$GF(2^8) = GF(2)[x]/(x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1)$$
 compute

with $z = y^{-1}$.

TU/e Technische Universiteit Eindhoven University of Technology

2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Stream Ciphers and Block Ciphers

Rijndael S-box:

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	с	d	е	f
00	63	7c	77	7b	f2	6b	6f	c5	30	01	67	2b	fe	d7	ab	76
10	ca	82	c9	7d	fa	59	47	fO	ad	d4	a2	af	9c	a4	72	c0
20	b7	fd	93	26	36	3f	f7	сс	34	a5	e5	f1	71	d8	31	15
30	04	c7	23	c3	18	96	05	9a	07	12	80	e2	eb	27	b2	75
40	09	83	2c	1a	1b	6e	5a	a0	52	Зb	d6	b3	29	e3	2f	84
50	53	d1	00	ed	20	fc	b1	5b	6a	cb	be	39	4a	4c	58	cf
60	d0	ef	aa	fb	43	4d	33	85	45	f9	02	7f	50	3c	9f	a8
70	51	a3	40	8f	92	9d	38	f5	bc	b6	da	21	10	ff	f3	d2
80	cd	0c	13	ec	5f	97	44	17	c4	a7	7e	3d	64	5d	19	73
90	60	81	4f	dc	22	2a	90	88	46	ee	b8	14	de	5e	0b	db
a0	e0	32	3a	0a	49	06	24	5c	c2	d3	ac	62	91	95	e4	79
b0	e7	c8	37	6d	8d	d5	4e	a9	6c	56	f4	ea	65	7a	ae	08
c0	ba	78	25	2e	1c	a6	b4	c6	e8	dd	74	1f	4b	bd	8b	8a
d0	70	3e	b5	66	48	03	f6	0e	61	35	57	b9	86	c1	1d	9e
e0	e1	f8	98	11	69	d9	8e	94	9b	1e	87	e9	ce	55	28	df
fO	8c	a1	89	0d	bf	e6	42	68	41	99	2d	Of	b0	54	bb	16



2WC12 Cryptography I - Fall 2014

Optimizations for 32-bit Architectures:

• Lookup tables T_0, \ldots, T_3 combining all steps.



20/22

2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Optimizations for 32-bit Architectures:

• Lookup tables T_0, \ldots, T_3 combining all steps.

Security Concerns:

- Theoretical attacks reduce security of AES-128 to 2^{126.1}.
- Cache-timing attacks are practical attacks but require precise timing measurements.
 - \rightarrow AES implementations must be resistant to timing attacks!



Optimizations for 32-bit Architectures:

• Lookup tables T_0, \ldots, T_3 combining all steps. Λ

Security Concerns:

- Theoretical attacks reduce security of AES-128 to 2^{126.1}.
- Cache-timing attacks are practical attacks but require precise timing measurements.
 - \rightarrow AES implementations must be resistant to timing attacks!



Optimizations for 32-bit Architectures:

• Lookup tables T_0, \ldots, T_3 combining all steps. Λ

Security Concerns:

- Theoretical attacks reduce security of AES-128 to 2^{126.1}.
- Cache-timing attacks are practical attacks but require precise timing measurements.
 - \rightarrow AES implementations must be resistant to timing attacks!

High-Speed Implementations:

- NaCl: http://nacl.cr.yp.to/features.html
- http://cryptojedi.org/crypto/index.shtml#aesbs



20/22

2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Plaintext-Based Attacks:

- known plaintext
- chosen plaintext
- adaptive chosen plaintext



2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Plaintext-Based Attacks:

- known plaintext
- chosen plaintext
- adaptive chosen plaintext

Ciphertext-Based Attacks:

- ciphertext only
- chosen ciphertext
- adaptive chosen ciphertext



2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Plaintext-Based Attacks:

- known plaintext
- chosen plaintext
- adaptive chosen plaintext

Ciphertext-Based Attacks:

- ciphertext only
- chosen ciphertext
- adaptive chosen ciphertext

Linear Cryptanalysis:

- known plaintext attack
- statistical analysis against large amounts of plaintext



Plaintext-Based Attacks:

- known plaintext
- chosen plaintext
- adaptive chosen plaintext

Ciphertext-Based Attacks:

- ciphertext only
- chosen ciphertext
- adaptive chosen ciphertext

Linear Cryptanalysis:

- known plaintext attack
- statistical analysis against large amounts of plaintext

Differential Cryptanalysis:

- chosen plaintext attack
- statistical analysis of the difference of two inputs and the difference of the outputs



2WC12 Cryptography I - Fall 2014

Stream and Block Ciphers:

Chapter 6 and 7, *Handbook of Applied Cryptography*, A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot, and S. Vanstone, CRC Press, 1996.

AES:

AES Proposal Rijndael, Joan Daemen, Vincent Rijmen

Linear and Differential Cryptanalysis:

A Tutorial on Linear and Differential Cryptanalysis, Howard M. Heys



22/22

2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014