

Cryptographic hash functions I

Practical aspects and generic hardness

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2MMC10 – Cryptology

Motivation

Want a short handle to some larger piece of data such that:

- even a small change in the large data leads to a very different handle; handle can serve as fingerprint
- it (probably uniquely) identifies the larger piece of data; (think of PGP fingerprints)
- one cannot compute the fingerprint without knowing all the data; fingerprint forms a commitment to the data.
- the fingerprints are (close to) uniformly distributed; (can use them – or parts thereof – to assign data to buckets or next steps to random walks.)
- one cannot reconstruct the data from the fingerprint. (at least sometimes that's desired.)

Cryptographic hash functions - practical definition

A cryptographic hash function H maps bit strings of arbitrary length to bit strings of length n .

$$H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$$

The input space might be further restricted.

A secure hash function satisfies the following 3 properties:

Preimage resistance: Given $y \in H(\{0, 1\}^*)$ finding $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$ with $H(x) = y$ is hard.

Second preimage resistance: Given $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$ finding $x' \in \{0, 1\}^*$ with $x \neq x'$ and $H(x') = H(x)$ is hard.

Collision resistance: Finding $x, x' \in \{0, 1\}^*$ with $x \neq x'$ and $H(x') = H(x)$ is hard.

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y is fixed and known to be the image of some $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$. Typically there are many such x , but it should be computationally hard to find any.

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Collision resistance: Finding $x, x' \in \{0, 1\}^*$ with $x \neq x'$ and $H(x') = H(x)$ is hard.

This property leaves full flexibility to choose any target y . Nevertheless it should be computationally hard to find any $x \neq x'$ with the same image.

Generic hardness

If the output of H is distributed uniformly then each y has a $1/2^n$ chance of being the image.

Hence it takes about 2^n calls to H to find a preimage.

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
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
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These are the *highest possible* complexities one can hope for.

Some hash functions require far fewer operation to break.



Practical use hash functions

Hash functions are often called the Swiss-army knife of cryptography. They are used in

- key-derivation functions
- public-key signatures
- symmetric-key authentication

Cryptographic libraries support several hash functions:

- In use and probably OK: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512; SHA-3, SHAKE, other SHA-3 finalists.
- SHA-1 is still in use for fingerprints, e.g. for git and PGP. Collisions were computed in 2017 <https://shattered.io/>. Practical attack (chosen prefix collision) in 2020 <https://sha-mbles.github.io/>
- MD5: collisions (2004) and chosen-prefix collisions (2008). Flame malware (2012) used MD5 collision to create signature on fake Windows update.
- MD4: collisions (1995), very efficient collisions (2004).