


Cryptographic Hash Functions Part II

Cryptography 1

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hash function design - iterated compression



Merkle-Damgård construction


- assume that message m can be split up into blocks m_1, \dots, m_s of equal block length r
 - most popular block length is $r = 512$
- *compression function*: $CF: \{0,1\}^n \times \{0,1\}^r \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$
- *intermediate hash values* (length n) as CF input and output
- *message blocks* as second input of CF
- start with fixed initial IHV_0 (a.k.a. $IV = \text{initialization vector}$)
- iterate $CF: IHV_1 = CF(IHV_0, m_1), IHV_2 = CF(IHV_1, m_2), \dots, IHV_s = CF(IHV_{s-1}, m_s),$
- take $h(m) = IHV_s$ as hash value
- advantages:
 - this design makes *streaming* possible
 - hash function analysis becomes compression function analysis
 - analysis easier because domain of CF is finite

padding

- ***padding***: add dummy bits to satisfy block length requirement
- **non-ambiguous padding**: add one **1-bit** and as many **0-bits** as necessary to fill the final block
 - when original message length is a multiple of the block length, apply padding anyway, adding an extra dummy block
 - any other non-ambiguous padding will work as well

Merkle-Damgård strengthening

- let padding leave final **64** bits open
- encode in those **64** bits the original message length
 - that's why messages of length $\geq 2^{64}$ are not supported
- reasons:
 - needed in the proof of the Merkle-Damgård theorem
 - prevents some attacks such as
 - trivial collisions for random **IV**




- now $h(IHV_0, m_1 || m_2) = h(IHV_1, m_2)$
- see next slide for more


continued

- fixpoint attack

fixpoint: IHV , m such that $CF(IHV, m) = IHV$




- long message attack



compression function collisions


- **collision** for a compression function: m_1, m_2, IHV such that $CF(IHV, m_1) = CF(IHV, m_2)$
- **pseudo-collision** for a compression function: m_1, m_2, IHV_1, IHV_2 such that $CF(IHV_1, m_1) = CF(IHV_2, m_2)$
- **Theorem (Merkle-Damgård)**: If the compression function CF is pseudo-collision resistant, then a hash function h derived by Merkle-Damgård iterated compression is collision resistant.
 - Proof: Suppose $h(m_1) = h(m_2)$, then
 - If m_1 and m_2 same size: locate the iteration where the collision occurs
 - Else a pseudo collision for CF appears in the last blocks (cont. length)
- **Note:**
 - a method to find pseudo-collisions does not lead to a method to find collisions for the hash function
 - a method to find collisions for the compression function is almost a method to find collisions for the hash function, we 'only' have a wrong IHV

the MD4 family of hash functions



design of MD4 family compression functions

message block
split into words
message expansion
input words for
each step
IHV → initial state
each step updates
state with an
input word
final state 'added'
to *IHV*
(feed-forward)



design details

- **MD4, MD5, SHA-0, SHA-1 details:**
 - 512-bit message block split into 16 32-bit words
 - state consists of 4 (MD4, MD5) or 5 (SHA-0, SHA-1) 32-bit words
 - MD4: 3 rounds of 16 steps each, so 48 steps, 48 input words
 - MD5: 4 rounds of 16 steps each, so 64 steps, 64 input words
 - SHA-0, SHA-1: 4 rounds of 20 steps each, so 80 steps, 80 input words
 - message expansion and step operations use only very easy to implement operations:
 - bitwise Boolean operations
 - bit shifts and bit rotations
 - addition modulo 2^{32}
 - proper mixing believed to be cryptographically strong

message expansion

- MD4, MD5 use *roundwise permutation*, for MD5:
 - $W_0 = M_0, W_1 = M_1, \dots, W_{15} = M_{15},$
 - $W_{16} = M_1, W_{17} = M_6, \dots, W_{31} = M_{12},$ (jump 5 mod 16)
 - $W_{32} = M_5, W_{33} = M_8, \dots, W_{47} = M_2,$ (jump 3 mod 16)
 - $W_{48} = M_0, W_{49} = M_7, \dots, W_{63} = M_9$ (jump 7 mod 16)
- SHA-0, SHA-1 use *recursivity*
 - $W_0 = M_0, W_1 = M_1, \dots, W_{15} = M_{15},$
 - SHA-0: $W_i = W_{i-3} \text{ XOR } W_{i-8} \text{ XOR } W_{i-14} \text{ XOR } W_{i-16}$ for $i = 16, \dots, 79$
 - problem: k^{th} bit influenced only by k^{th} bits of preceding words, so not much diffusion
 - SHA-1: $W_i = (W_{i-3} \text{ XOR } W_{i-8} \text{ XOR } W_{i-14} \text{ XOR } W_{i-16}) \lll 1$
(additional rotation by 1 bit,
this is the *only* difference between SHA-0 and SHA-1)

Example: step operations in MD5

- in each step only one state word is updated
- the other state words are *rotated* by 1
- state update:

$$A' = B + ((A + f_i(B, C, D) + W_i + K_i) \lll s_i)$$

K_i, s_i step dependent constants,

$+$ is addition mod 2^{32} ,

f_i round dependend boolean functions:

$$f_i(x, y, z) = xy \text{ OR } (\neg x)z \text{ for } i = 1, \dots, 16,$$


$$f_i(x, y, z) = xz \text{ OR } y(\neg z) \text{ for } i = 17, \dots, 32,$$

$$f_i(x, y, z) = x \text{ XOR } y \text{ XOR } z \text{ for } i = 33, \dots, 48,$$

$$f_i(x, y, z) = y \text{ XOR } (y \text{ OR } (\neg z)) \text{ for } i = 49, \dots, 64,$$

these functions are nonlinear, balanced, and have an *avalanche effect*

step operations in MD5



provable hash functions

- people don't like that one can't prove much about hash functions
- reduction to established 'hard problem' such as factoring is seen as an advantage
- **Example: VSH – Very Smooth Hash**
 - Contini-Lenstra-Steinfeld 2006
 - collision resistance provable under assumption that a problem directly related to factoring is hard
 - but still far from ideal
 - bad performance compared to SHA-256
 - all kinds of multiplicative relations between hash values exist
 - not post-quantum secure

Life cycles of popular cryptographic hashes (the "Breakout" chart)

Function	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Snefru	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken
MD4	Unbroken	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken
MD5			Unbroken	Unbroken	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken
MD2			Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken
RIPEMD			Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken
HAVAL-128			Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken
SHA-0				Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken
SHA-1						Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened
RIPEMD-128							Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Deprecated	Deprecated	Deprecated	Deprecated	Deprecated	Deprecated	Deprecated	Deprecated	Deprecated	Deprecated	Deprecated	Deprecated	Deprecated
RIPEMD-160							Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Deprecated	Deprecated
SHA-2 family											Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	[2]	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened	Weakened
SHA-3 (Keccak)																				Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken	Unbroken

Key Unbroken Weakened Broken Deprecated

[1] Note that 128-bit hashes are at best 2^{64} complexity to break; using a 128-bit hash is irresponsible based on sheer digest length.

[2] In 2007, the [NIST launched the SHA-3 competition](#) because "Although there is no specific reason to believe that a practical attack on any of the SHA-2 family of hash functions is imminent, a successful collision attack on an algorithm in the SHA-2 family could have catastrophic effects for digital signatures." One year later the first strength reduction was published.

[The Hash Function Lounge](#) has an excellent list of references for most of the dates. Wikipedia now has references to the rest.

Collisions for MD5

Example Hash-then-Sign in Browser

The screenshot shows a Windows Internet Explorer browser window displaying the Rabobank Nederland website. A 'Website Identification' dialog box is open, indicating that VeriSign has identified the site as 'Rabobank Nederland, Utrecht, NL' and that the connection is encrypted. Below this, a 'Certificate' window is open, showing the details of the certificate. The 'General' tab is selected, and the 'Show:' dropdown is set to '<All>'. The certificate details are as follows:

Field	Value
Serial number	43.03.92.e8.5c.28.d8.bc.9a.82...
Signature algorithm	sha1RSA
Signature hash algorithm	sha1
Issuer	VeriSign Class 3 Extended Vali...
Valid from	woensdag 18 juli 2012 2:00:00
Valid to	vrijdag 19 juli 2013 1:59:59
Subject	bankieren.rabobank.nl, Name ...
Public key	RSA (2048 Bits)

Below the table, the following information is displayed:

```

CN = bankieren.rabobank.nl
OU = Name IT bx
O = Rabobank Nederland
STREET = Croeselaan 18
L = Utrecht
S = Utrecht
PostalCode = 3521CB
C = NL
SERIALNUMBER = 30046259
  
```

Buttons for 'Edit Properties...', 'Copy to File...', and 'OK' are visible at the bottom of the certificate window. The background website shows a login form with fields for 'Inloggennummer/IBAN' and 'pincode', and a 'Random Reader' section. A sidebar on the right contains links for 'Aanvragen', 'Help', and 'Informatie over Rabo Internetbankieren'.

Wang's attack on MD5


- *two-block collision*
 - for any input IHV , identical for the two messages
i.e. $IHV_0 = IHV_0', \Delta IHV_0 = 0$
 - *near-collision* after first block:
 $IHV_1 = CF(IHV_0, m_1), IHV_1' = CF(IHV_0, m_1')$,
with ΔIHV_1 having only a few carefully chosen ± 1 s
 - full collision after second block:
 $IHV_2 = CF(IHV_1, m_2), = CF(IHV_1', m_2')$,
i.e. $IHV_2 = IHV_2', \Delta IHV_2 = 0$
- with IHV_0 the standard IV for MD5, and a third block for padding and MD-strengthening, this gives a collision for the full MD5

chosen-prefix collisions

- latest development on MD5
- **Marc Stevens (TU/e MSc student) 2006**
 - paper by Marc Stevens, Arjen Lenstra and Benne de Weger, EuroCrypt 2007
- **Marc Stevens (CWI PhD student) 2009**
 - paper by Marc Stevens, Alex Sotirov, Jacob Appelbaum, David Molnar, Dag Arne Osvik, Arjen Lenstra and Benne de Weger, Crypto 2007
 - rogue CA attack

MD5: identical IV attacks

- all attacks following Wang's method, up to recently
- MD5 collision attacks work for any starting *IHV*
data before and after the collision can be *chosen at will*
- but starting *IHV*s must be identical
data before and after the collision *must be identical*
- called *random collision*




MD5: different IV attacks

- **new attack**
 - Marc Stevens, TU/e
 - Oct. 2006
- **MD5 collisions for any starting pair $\{IHV_1, IHV_2\}$**

data before the collision *needs not to be identical*

data before the collision can still be chosen at will, for each of the two documents

data after the collision still must be identical
- **called *chosen-prefix collision***



indeed that was not the end in 2008 the ethical hackers came by

observation: commercial certification authorities still use MD5


idea: proof of concept of realistic attack as wake up call
→ attack a real, commercial certification authority

purchase a web certificate for a valid web domain

but with a “little tweak” built in

prepare a rogue CA certificate with identical MD5 hash
the commercial CA’s signature also holds for the rogue CA
certificate

Outline of the RogueCA Attack



colliding certificates using chosen-prefix collisions, 2008

legitimate website
certificate

serial number
commercial CA name
validity period
domain name
2048 bit RSA public key
v3 extensions Subject = End Entity
signature

rogue CA certificate

serial number
commercial CA name
validity period
rogue CA name
1024 bit RSA public key
v3 extensions Subject = CA
tumor
signature

chosen prefixes

collision bits

identical suffixes

problems to be solved

predict the serial number

predict the time interval of validity

at the same time

a few days before

more complicated certificate structure

“Subject Type” after the public key

small space for the collision blocks

is possible but much more computations needed

not much time to do computations

to keep probability of prediction success reasonable

how difficult is predicting?

time interval:

CA uses automated certification procedure
certificate issued exactly 6 seconds after click

I Approve

I Do Not Approve

serial number :

Nov 3 07:44:08 2008 GMT	643006
Nov 3 07:45:02 2008 GMT	643007
Nov 3 07:46:02 2008 GMT	643008
Nov 3 07:47:03 2008 GMT	643009
Nov 3 07:48:02 2008 GMT	643010
Nov 3 07:49:02 2008 GMT	643011
Nov 3 07:50:02 2008 GMT	643012
Nov 3 07:51:12 2008 GMT	643013
Nov 3 07:51:29 2008 GMT	643014
Nov 3 07:52:02 2008 GMT	have a guess...

the attack at work

estimated: 800-1000 certificates issued in a weekend

procedure:

1. buy certificate on Friday, serial number $S-1000$
2. predict serial number S for time T Sunday evening
3. make collision for serial number S and time T : 2 days time
4. short before T buy additional certificates until $S-1$
5. buy certificate on time $T-6$
hope that nobody comes in between and steals our serial number S

to let it work

**cluster of >200
PlayStation3
game consoles
(1 PS3 = 40 PC's)**

**complexity: 2^{50}
memory: 30 GB**

→ collision in 1 day



result

success after 4th attempt (4th weekend)

**purchased a few hundred certificates
(promotion action: 20 for one price)
total cost: < US\$ 1000**

conclusion on MD5

- at this moment, ‘meaningful’ hash collisions are
 - easy to make
 - but also easy to detect
 - still hard to abuse realistically
- with chosen-prefix collisions we come close to realistic attacks
- to do *real* harm, second pre-image attack needed
 - real harm is e.g. forging digital signatures
 - this is not possible yet, not even with MD5
- More information: <http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/>

Questions?

proof of birthday paradox

- probability that all k elements are distinct is

$$\prod_{i=0}^{k-1} \frac{t-i}{t} = \prod_{i=0}^{k-1} \left(1 - \frac{i}{t}\right) \leq \prod_{i=0}^{k-1} e^{-\frac{i}{t}} = e^{-\sum_{i=0}^{k-1} \frac{i}{t}} = e^{-\frac{k(k-1)}{2t}}$$

and this is $< \frac{1}{2}$ when $k(k-1) > (2 \log 2)t$
 $(\approx k^2) \quad (\approx 1.4 t)$