

Homework sheet 2, due 11 January 2018 at 13:45

Some of these exercises require more knowledge than you have when they come out. We will cover the missing parts next week but you can already start on the first part.

Submit your homework by encrypted and signed email to Gustavo and Tanja. This time a different member of your group should handle the submission; ideally you should cc your group members. Do not forget to attach your public key if we don't have it yet.

1. In SSLv3 one of the two options for symmetric encryption is DES in CBC mode. To protect against message forgery a message authentication code MAC is used. SSLv3 uses the MAC-then-encrypt approach, thus a message m first gets encoded as $M = m || \text{MAC}(m) || \text{pad} = M_1 \dots M_{\ell-1} M_\ell$ and then encrypted using DES with CBC. The padding pad is chosen so that the total length of M in bytes is a multiple of 8 (to match the block size of DES) and that the last byte states the length of the padding (including this byte) in bytes. Note, the latter means that there always has to be a padding, even if $m || \text{MAC}(m)$ has length a multiple of 8. There are no further requirements on how the padding is chosen. Upon receiving a ciphertext C , a computer will decrypt the message M , read the last byte to learn the length of the padding to identify m and $\text{MAC}(m)$, and finally verify the MAC. If this verification fails the computer will close the connection.

(a) Just as a reminder of how CBC works, write how you decrypt the last block of the ciphertext. 1 point

- (b) Assume that $C = C_0 C_1 \dots C_{\ell-1} C_\ell$ is a ciphertext so that the C_ℓ block comes entirely from the encryption of pad. The first block C_0 contains the IV. What is the value of the last byte in M_ℓ ? Show how this gives you a method that for each $0 < i < \ell$ you can test whether the last byte of M_i matches a publicly available value (computed from the C_i).

To give a concrete example let $C_0 = 01\ 23\ 45\ 67\ 89\ AB\ CD\ EF$, $C_{\ell-1} = 12\ 34\ 56\ 78\ 9A\ BC\ DE\ F0$ (in hex) and (like above) let C_ℓ come entirely from padding. What value of the last byte of M_1 can you test for? 8 points

2. Users A, B, C, D , and E are friends of S . They have public keys $(e_A, n_A) = (5, 62857)$, $(e_B, n_B) = (5, 64541)$, $(e_C, n_C) = (5, 69799)$, $(e_D, n_D) = (5, 89179)$, and $(e_E, n_E) = (5, 82583)$. You know that S sends the same message to all of them and you observe the ciphertexts $c_A = 11529$, $c_B = 60248$, $c_C = 27504$, $c_D = 43997$, and $c_E = 44926$. Compute the message.

For this exercise use your computer as a calculator with arbitrary precision – but do not use built in functions for computing CRT or inverses. 8 points

3. Alice has RSA public key $(e, n) = (3, 262063)$. You capture two messages $c_1 = 156417$ and $c_2 = 6125$ to her and know that the corresponding plaintexts are related as $m_2 = 7m_1 + 19$. Compute the messages m_1 and m_2 . 3 points

4. Alice is a web merchant offering encrypted connections using semi-static DH in $\mathbb{F}_{103}^*$ in the subgroup of order $\ell = 51$ generated by 2.

For this exercise you should not use your computer for more functions than a pocket calculator offers you; in particular make sure to give full details when computing inverses and exponentiations.

(a) Verify that 2 has order 51, justify your computation and try to use not too many multiplications and squarings. 2 points

- (b) Alice's public key is $h_A = 30$. Use the baby-step giant-step algorithm to compute an integer a between 0 and 50 so that $g^a = h_A$, i.e. compute the discrete logarithm of Alice's key. Solutions using brute-force search for a will not be accepted. Make sure to verify your result by computing g^a . 8 points